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NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI
CASES
NATURE OF THE HOMESTEAD RicHT.-Homestead exemption laws are
strictly of American origin; their object is to protect the home of
each citizen where his family may be sheltered and live beyond the
reach of financial misfortune.' At the time of their inception 2 the
principle that the real estate of a decedent shall be liable for his
debts was generally in force in England and the United States. Such
had been the common law of the Colonies,' and, although probably
not a part of the common law as adopted in Missouri,' that principle
has been in force by statute in this state since 1825. 5 Since the home-
stead statutes must take effect in derogation of this principle it is
apparent that they should be given no broader construction than Is
necessary to carry out the purposes of their enactment. Some deci-
sions, Indeed, are to the effect that they should be construed liberally
in favor of the debtor.
Missouri homestead laws date from the statute of 1863, 7 which
provided for an exemption of the homestead from sale under execu-
1. 21 Cyc. 459, note 5.
2. The first homestead statute was enacted by the Republic of Texas in
1839.
3. 4 Kent's Comm. (13th ed.) 463.
4. M ssouri adopted the common law and British statutes as of the year
1607. Revised Statutes 1909, § 8047.
5. Revised Statutes 1825, p. 106.
6. 21 Cyc. 461, note 26.
7. Laws of 1862-3. p. 22. Marshall, J., apparently overlooked this statute
In his dissenting opinion in Keene v. Wyatt (1900) 160 Mo. 1, 10, 60 S. W.
1037.
(33)
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tion or other process, during the life of the head of the family, and
continued that exemption after his death for the benefit of his widow
during life, and for the minor children during their minority.
Apparently no case involving this statute ever came to the Supreme
Court,' and it was replaced two years later by the statute of 1865, 9
which provided for an exemption during the life of the head of the.
family, and provided further that "if any such head of the family shall
die leaving a widow and minor children, his homestead shall pass to
and vest in such widow and children free from the payment of his
debts, and such widow and children shall take the same estate of
which the deceased died seised, provided, that such children shall,
by the force of this chapter, only have an interest in such homestead
until they shall attain their majority." 10 The statute of 1863 probably
established only a period of exemption. That of 1865 shows a different
intent. In the case of Skouten v. Wood," the court, construing that
statute, held that where there were no minor children the widow took
the estate of which her husband died selsed, that she could dispose
of it, and that upon her death it would pass to her heirs. The interest
of minor children under this statute seems to have been regarded as
a right to occupy jointly with the widow during minority,12 or
exclusively against her vendee during that period,"3 though there is a
dictum in one case 1, to the effect that they took the estate jointly with
the widow, their estate being determinable upon their attaining their
majority. The homestead did not become liable for debts after the
death of the widow, and the attainment of majority by the children-
the exemption was absolute; '5 and the estate vested in the widow
whether there were any debts or not."5 Thus the statute of 1865 took
the homestead tract out from .under the operation of the general
statutes of descent and gave it to the heirs of the widow rather than
to those of the husband. This feature caused the amendment of
1875.17
The statute of 1875 restricted the period of exemption to the life
of the widow and the minority of the children, and provided further
that "all the right, title, and interest of the deceased head of the
family, except the estate of homestead thus continued, shall be subject
to the laws relating to devise, descent, dower, partition, and sale for"
S. See opinion by Napton, J., in V'ogler v. Montgornery (1874) 54 Mo. 577.
9. Laws of 1865, Chap. 111.
10. This act was copied from the Vermont statute. The Missouri courts
were inclined to follow those of Vermont in construing the statute. See
Gragg v. Gragg (1877) 65 Mo. 343.
11. (1874) 57 Mo. 380.
12. Ganole v. Hurt (1883) 78 Mo. 649: Rogers v. Marsh (1880) 73 Mo. 64.
13. Roberts v. Ware (1883) 80 Mo. 363.
14. Keyte v. Peary (1887) 2. Mo. App. 394.
15. French v. Stratton (1883) 79 Mo. 560.
16. Freunid v. McCall (1881) 73 Mo. 343.
17. Laws of 1875, p. 61, § 1: re-enacted in Revised Statutes 1879. § 269&
NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES
the payment of debts against the estate of the deceased." Thus the
homestead tract, except for the period of exemption, was replaced
under the operation of the laws mentioned. Such was the view taken
in the case of Poland v. Vesper,18 where the court said, "It is the
homestead right which is exempt, nothing more. There remains an
estate in the land which descends to the heirs of the deceased,
and by the express provisions of the statute is subject to the laws
relating to partition and sale for the payment of debts of the
deceased." Under this decision, which was uniformly followed, while
the act of 1875 was in force,"9 although the homestead tract could not
be reached. by creditors of the head of the family during his life,
20
after his death it could be sold to pay his debts, subject to the
homestead right, the purchaser being entitled to possession after the
death of the widow and the coming of age of the children. Ap-
parently, then, the act of 1875 gave the widow a life estate in the
homestead tract free from the debts of the husband, the children
estates for years similarly free, and the heirs of the deceased a vested
remainder subject at once to sale for the payment of such debts.
The statute of 1875 was amended by that of 1895 21 which struck
out those words which had replaced all the interest in the homestead
tract, except the estate of homestead, under the operation of the laws
relating to descent, sale for payment of debts, etc., and substituted
for them this provision, "that is to say, the children shall have the
joint right of occupation with the widow until they arrive respectively
at their majority, and the widow shall have the right to occupy such
homestead during her life or widowhood, and upon her death or
remarriage it shall pass to the heirs of the husband."
The first case under the statute as amended was that of Broyles v.
Cox.2" The husband died in 1896,28 seised in fee of certain premises
as a homestead, and indebted beyond the value of the remainder of the
estate. The court held that the fee could not be sold subject to the
homestead right during the widowhood of the wife or the minority
of the children. One year later, in the case of In re Powell's Estate,
24
the court reaffirmed this view. The basis of this decision was s tted
by Valliant, J., as follows: "The precise question here presented was
decided by this court in Broyles v. Cox wherein it was shown that the
18. (1878) 67 Mo. 727.
19. Hannah v. Hannah (1891) 109 Mo. 236, 19 S. W. 87: Murrhy v. De
France (1891) 105 Mo. 53, 15 S. W. 949 (semble) Schaeffer v. Beldmeier(1891) 107 Mo. 314, 17 S. W. 797; Tucker v. Wells (1892) 111 Mo. 399, 20 S. W.114. 20. Macke v. Byrd (1895) 131 Mo. 682, 33 S. W. 448; Ratliffe v. Graves(1895) 132 Mo. 76. 33 S. W. 450.
21. Revised Statutes 1899, § 3620.
22. (1899) 1.53 Mo. 242, 54 S. W. 488.
23. It had been previously decided In Brown v. Brown's Adm'r (1878)
68 Mo. 888, 390, that the law governing was the statute in force at the date
of the husband's death. Accord, Bretvisgton v. Brewington (1908) 211 Mo.
48. 109 S. W. 723.
24. (1900) 157 Mo. 151. 57 S. W. 717.
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land could not be sold subject to the homestead rights, even under the
law as it was under the act of 1875." We have already seen the error
of this statement," and the court in bane promptly overruled this
point in the decisions of Broyles v. Cox and In re Powell's Estate
when it was called to their attention in Keene v. Wyatt,17 a year
later. Since the case of Keene v. Wyatt Involved only the statute
of 1875 the construction put upon the act of 1895 by Broyles v. Cox
and In re Powell's Estate was not considered there. But the question
came up again in Balance v. Gordon 27 and the court reaffirmed its
former holding, and adjudged void a sale of the homestead tract
subject to the homestead rights, made during the widowhood of the
wife or the minority of the children. And in this case the decision
is rested upon the fact that the amendment of 1895 struck out that
clause of the act of 1875, which expressly replaced the homestead tract
under the operation of the general laws of descent and sale for pay-
ment of debts.
The recent case of Armor v. Lewis 28 is in line with the decision
in Balance v. Gordon. In Armor v. Lewis, the probate court ordered
a sale of the homestead "subject to the rights of the widow and
minor children," to pay claims against the estate. The administrator
sold the tract under this order. In a proceeding to determine title
under this sale the trial court held that no title passed to the pur-
chaser by the administrator's deed. The Supreme Court, Bond, J.,
dissenting, affirmed this decision on appeal. Lamm, C. J., who wrote
the opinion, says, "We think this judgment should be affirmed (1)
on authority and (2) on reason." And under the first of these heads
he cites Broyles v. Cox, In re Powell's Estate, and Balance v. Gordon.
In the first two of these cases, as we have seen, the court proceeded
upon the mistaken notion that their decision was the same as would
have been proper under the Act of 1875. In Balance v. Gordon in
addition to relying on these two cases, the court took the position
that the remedy of a creditor against the homestead estate of the
decedent was given by the Act of 1875 and taken away by that of
1895. We have already seen that this remedy was in force long before
the first homestead statute was ever exacted. True, the statute of
1865 took it away but the Act of 1875 replaced the homestead tract
under the general laws, subjecting it to sale for payment of debts,
repealing the Act of 1865, and the Act of 1895, although it did not
re-enact those repealing words, did not revive the Act of 1865. The
Act of 1895 must, therefore, stand out as a statute of exemption against
the background of the provisions for sale of the property of a
25. Poland v. Vesper, supra, and cases cited under Note 19. supra.
26. (1901) 160 Mo. 1, 60 S. W. 1037.
27. (1912) 247 Mo. 119, 132 S. W. 358.
28. (1913) 161 S. W. 251.
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decedent to pay his debts, and it should be given no construction
broader than is necessary to carry out the purposes of its enactment-
to provide a home for the widow and children during widowhood and
minority. By the express provisions of the statute the right of the
widow and children is limited to a right to occupy during widowhood
and minority; the fee, therefore, must be in the heirs by way of
remainder-a remainder which is vested, under the definition of that
interest as laid down by the Missouri courts.2 9
In demonstrating that the result of Armor v. Lewis is in accord
with "the reason of the thing," the learned writer of the majority
opinion states, "It has been held that the homestead and the fee are
not two separate and divisible interests," and cites Bank v. Guthrie.5
But that was a case of an attempted sale, during the life of the house-
holder, of the homestead tract subject to his homestead right, whereas
the present case arises after the death of the head of the family.
The further proposition relied upon Is that the sale of the fee subject
to the homestead rights sacrifices the interests of the widow and
children. It is difficult to see how the sale of the fee cheapens the
interest of, or lessens the protection afforded to these persons. Their
right to occupy is not interfered with, and that is all the statute of
1895 leaves them. True, the vested remainder of the heirs of the
husband may be sacrificed, but the heirs are not the object of the
beneficent provisions of the statute.
Two objectionable results of Armor v. Lewis are apparent. First,
the administration of the estate must be kept open for an indefinite
number of years, while the debts go on at interest, or else the home-
stead property must be absolutely withdrawn from liability for debts,
to the injury of creditors and to the benefit of the householder's
heirs, but without any beneficial results to the widow and minor
children." Second, although by the provisions of the statute of 1895
the interest of the widow and children is limited to a right to occupy,
the court assumes the position "' that the land does not descend to
the heirs until the period of exemption has elapsed. Where is the
fee in the meantime? Have we here a statutory determinable fee?
Upon these considerations it is submitted that the result of Armor
v. Lewis is not necessary to the purposes of the Homestead Act of
1895, that it is in conflict with principles which have long been a part
29. Jones v. Waters (1853) 17 Mo. 589: Waddell v. Waddell (1889) 99
Mo. 338, 12 S. W. 349: Cheiw v. Keller (1889) 100 Mo. 362, 13 S. W. 395:
Rodney v. Landon (1891) 104 Mo. 251, 15 S. W. 962; Byrne v. France (1895)
131 Mo. 639, 33 S. W. 178.
30. (1894) 127 Mo. 189, 29 S. W. 1004.
31. in re Powell's Estate (1900) 157 Mo. 151, 155, where the following
statement Is to be found : "Whether after the majority of the heirs and the
death or remarriage of the widow the land may be sold to pay debts Is a
question which may arise in the future."
32. Broyles v. Cox (1899) 153 Mo. 242, 251.
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of Missouri law, and that the dissenting opinion of Bond, J., Is to be
preferred to that of the majority.'3  G. C. W. JR.
PENAL AND REMEDIAL FEATURES OF MISSOURI "DEATH STATUTE."-
In the statutory revision of 1855 the so-called "Death Statute" of
Missouri was passed.' There are two main divisions of this act, and
they have survived with some changes to the present day. Section 2,
inter alia, covered recovery for injuries by public conveyances result-
ing from "negligence, unskillfulness or criminal intent," on the part
of officers, agents, servants, etc., and the section provided that the
defendant "shall forfeit and pay for every such person or passenger
so dying the sum of five thousand dollars." Section 3 was general in
its application, allowing a recovery "whenever the death of a person
shall be caused by a wrongful act, neglect or default of another,"
which "would (if death had not ensued) have entitled the party
injured to maintain an action."' Section 4 provided that in actions
brought under section 3 "the jury may give such damages as they
may deem fair and Just, not exceeding five thousand dollars, with
reference to the necessary injury resulting from such death to the
surviving parties who may be entitled to sue, and, also, having regard
to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending such wrong-
fult act, neglect, or default." In 1905 section 2 was amended by the
adding and changing of a number of words and phrases.8 Since this
amendment the section, instead of providing that the defendant "shall
forfeit and pay," provides that he shall "forfeit and pay as a penalty,"
and instead of providing for the payment of the set sum of $5,000,
there Is substituted the provision that the defendant shall pay "the
sum of not less than two thousand dollars and not exceeding ten
thousand dollars in the discretion of the jury."' The old section 3
was in 19075 changed so that the amount recoverable shall not ex-
ceed $10,000 Instead of $5,000.8
There has been little necessity for determining whether sections
3 and 4, are penal or remedial. The act merely sets a limit not to be
exceeded, and the damages to the party entitled to sue are to be
determined within those limits by the jury. It is well settled that
33. In 1907 the statute of 1895 was amended by inserting a provision
absolutely prohibiting a sale of the homestead for debts of the husband
(except as such debts had been legally charged on his estate during his life).
This at least shows that under the statute of 1895 the question was still
thought to be a doubtful one. even after the cases of Broyles v. Cox and
In re Powell's Estate. See Laws of 1907, p. 301; Revised Statutes 1909, §
6708.
1. Revised Statutes 1855, Chap. 51.
2. But an Injury covered by § 2 is excluded from the operation of § 3.
Ca8ey v. Transit Co. (1907) 205 Mo. 721, 103 S. W. 1146.
3. Laws 1905, p. 135.
4. Now Revised Statutes 1909, § 5425.
5. Laws of 1907, p. 252.
6. The original sections 3 and 4 as amended are to be found now in Revised
Statutes 1909. §§ 5426 and 5427.
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the earning power of deceased and the number of children that the
death has compelled the plaintiff to support are elements for con-
sideration.7
So too there was no very serious difficulty encountered in applying
section 2, in its original form, although different views of its character
were expressed by the courts. The early case of Coover v. Moore s held
that the section was not penal, but was compensatory, damages
being liquidated by the statute. But Philpott v. Railroad 9 was a case
where parents were suing for damages to their minor son nineteen
years old, and there the court said, "The statute is remedial and is
designed to be compensatory in part. The case at bar demonstrates
that it can not be wholly compensatory for the amount of the recovery
being fixed, as it is, is altogether out of proportion to the value of the
services of the son for the remainder of the period of his minority.
. . . The law as well as being compensatory is of a penal and
police nature and can without objections subserve both purposes at
one and the same time." This view prevailed. 10  Some difficulty arose
when plaintiff sued for less than the $5,000 specified. The Kansas
City Court of Appeals held that this was permissible." The St. Louis
Court of Appeals held that this was not permissible, as the statutory'
sum had a penal element in it necessitating suit for the exact penalty. 1"
'The Supreme Court settled the matter by adopting the decision and
the opinion of the St. Louis Court of Appeals."
Since the change of 1905, fixing the damages between $2,000 and
$10,000, the courts of Missouri have varied much in their characteriza-
tion of the statute. The St. Louis Court of Appeals held that the
statute was purely penal, but that a requested instruction that if
the jury found for the plaintiff they could not assess her damages at
more than the sum of $2,000 was properly refused, though there were
no aggravating circumstances." The Kansas City Court of Appeals
held that the remedy was entirely a penalty and not compensatory,
and yet the court held that the jury was properly instructed to
consider "the age, physical condition and earning capacity" of deceased
at the time of his death." A year later this same court, without
-discussing the point, held that the statute was both compensatory
and penal, and allowed evidence of the capacity of the deceased wife
7. Tetherow v. Railroad (1888) 98 Mo. 74, 11 S. W. 310; Soeder v.
Railroad (1890) 100 Mo. 673, 13 S. W. 714: O'Mellia v. Railroad (1892) 115
Mo. 205, 213 S. W. 503; Fisher v. Lead Co. (1900) 156 Mo. 479. 492. 56S. W. 1107, 1111; Morgan v. Mining Co. (1911) 100 Mo. App. 99, 141 S. W. 735.
8. (1862) 31 Mo. 574.
9. (1884) 85 Mo. 164.10. King v. Railroad (1889) 98 Mo. 235, 11 S. W. 563; Gilheson v.
Railroad (1999) 222 Mo. 173, 203, 121 S. W. 138, 147.
11. Marsh v. Railroad (1904) 104 Mo. App. 577. 78 S. W. 284.
12. Casey v. Transit Co. (1905) 110 Mo. 235, 91 S. W. 419.
13. Casey v. Transit Go. (1907) 205 Mo. 721, 103 S. W. 1146.
14. Potter v. Railroad (1909) 136 Mo. App. 125, 117 S. W. 593.15. Pratt v. Railroad (1909) 139 Mo. App. 502, 122 S. W. 1125.
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to do housework, relying on cases to this effect decided before the
amendment of 1905.16 On the other hand the Springfield Court of
Appeals in the next year held that the statute was entirely penal,
and that the nature of defendant's acts might be shown in order
to make the penalty assessed commensurately punitive, but that it
was reversible error to admit evidence of the deceased's earning
capacity, and of his being the head of a family.'
7
The amended statute first came before the Supreme Court for
consideration in the case of Young v. Railroad 18 where its constitu-
tionality was called in question because of the discretion allowed to
the jury in fixing the amount to be awarded. The court held that
the statute was "all penal in its character," but that it was constitu-
tional for the legislature to allow the jury to "adjust the amount of
penalty to the circumstances of the particular case." Boyd v. Rail-
road 19 held that the statute was penal and compensatory throughout,
and the pecuniary loss of the plaintiff was an element to be considered
as well as the circumstances of defendant's negligence. The Boyd
Case came up again,' 0 and this time the court held that the statute
is penal to the extent of the $2,000 which is recoverable, and that it
is remedial and compensatory to the extent to which recovery above
$2,000 is allowed; 21 and expressly overruled the Young Case and the
first decision in the Boyd Case in so far as they are inconsistent
with this holding. It was held that the earning capacity, age and
condition of health of the deceased and the circumstances of defend-
ant's acts were admissible under the remedial part of the action.
The court argued that the statute before the change of 1905 was largely
penal though it was also compensatory; that the substance rather than
the form of the statute is the test, and that, though the change of 1905
added the words "as a penalty," yet, as the amount of the recovery
is in the discretion of the jury, and as no test is prescribed for the
exercise of such discretion, .the legislative intent seemed to be to
allow admission of all the facts in the case, thus making the
recovery partially remedial.
The recent case of Johnson v. Railway 22 then came before the
Kansas City Court of Appeals. In that case the plaintiff sued for
16. Hartzler v. Railroad (1910) 140 Mo. App. 665, 126 S. W. 760,
17. Ervin v. Railroad (1911) 158 Mo. App. 1, 139 S. W. 498.
18. (1910) 227 Mo. 307, 127 S. W. 19.
19. (1911) 236 Mo. 54. 139 S. W. 561.
20. Boyd v. Railroad (1913) 249 Mo. 110, 155 S. W. 13.
21. This result is foreshadowed by a dictum in Murphy v. Railroad (1910)
228 Mo. 56, 86, 128 S. W. 481. 487. Lamm, J., speaking for the court said,
"But when the whole statute Is read and harmonized it might appear (by
construction) that the minimum amount Is left alone as nakedly and baldly
penal, and that the discretion of the jury to go above that amount might be
gauged on the theory of compensation, as pecuniary loss, or, if not that, as
having regard to the aggravating or mitigating circumstances of the Individual
case." But the court expressly reserved the point.
22. (1913) 160 S. W. 5.
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$2,000 only. The court refused to support the contention of defendant
that to come within the statute it was necessary to sue for $10,000,
the maximum amount prescribed by the statute. It was held that
under the second decision in the Boyd Case, 2 the plaintiff had either
one of two remedies-to sue for the penalty of $2,000, or to sue for
compensation plus the penalty, when he could recover between
$2,000 and $10,000. The case has been transferred to the Supreme
Court as involving the proper construction to be put on the last deci-
sion in the Boyd Case, and thereby raising the question of the con-
stitutionality of the statute.
This case of Johnson v. Railway seems to be a proper application
of the principle of the second decision in the Boyd Case, and will
probably be so recognized by the Supreme Court. It is not clear what
constitutional question is involved, and the Court of Appeals does not
indicate what it had in mind. Perhaps a desire on the part of the
court for the opinion of the Supreme Court on the matter of construc-
tion of the statute largely accounts for the transfer.
More difficulty appears with the Boyd Case itself, however. It
is to be noted that the instruction approved in the second decision
of that case allowed the jury to consider pecuniary loss to the plaintiff
and the facts constituting defendant's negligence, in determining the
amount of recovery between $2,000 and $10,000. How this is consistent
with the view there expressed is not quite apparent. If the statute
is entirely remedial above $2,000, it appears that the exclusion of the
facts constituting negligence should follow. Again, It seems that
consistency with the view of the twofold character of the statute
should compel instructions separating the elements of recovery. That
is, $2,000 should be recovered in all events, and if a pecuniary loss
of $3,000 is shown, this should be added. 2' It is not likely that the
Supreme Court desires or -would sanction either of these conclusions.
On the other hand the decision in the first Boyd Case, that the statute
is penal and compensatory throughout, avoids this embarassment, and
also conforms to the language of the amendment of 1905 that the
plaintiff shall recover between $2,000 and $10,000 "at the discretion
of the jury" which the defendant shall "forfeit and pay as a penalty."
But, under the first decision in the Boyd Case, holding that the
action is penal as well as compensatory throughout, the decision in
Johnson v. Railway would probably not be upheld, as the result would:
then be to allow the plaintiff to fix the amount of the penalty which
the defendant should pay.25  A. J.
23. Supro.
24. See in this connection Maer v. Met. St. Ry. Co. (1914) 162 S. W.1041.25. See Young v. Railroad (1909) 227 Mo. 307. 319. 127 S. W. 19:
Johnson v. Railroad (1913) 160 S. W. 5, 8: Cigar Makers v. Goldberg (1905
72 N. J. L. 214, 61 AtI. 457.
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FIXTUBES.-It was an ancient maxim of the law that whatever
became annexed to the land became a part of the land. The language
of antiquity was quicquid plantatur solo, solo cedit. Presumably at
an early period in the common law it was a hard and fast rule that
whatever was so incorporated with the realty as to become of an
immovable character became part and parcel of the realty, and
belonged to the owner of the land. The hardship of the rule led
the law courts at an early date to make an exception in favor of
chattels placed upon the land by a tenant. Indeed the whole subject
of fixtures may be classified under two general divisions: (1) fixtures
placed upon the land by a tenant; and (2) fixtures placed upon the
land by the owner. In the first division the character of the party
who annexes the chattel raises a presumption, or at least an "allow-
able inference" that the annexation was not intended to be permanent,
although to all appearances it may be firmly fixed to the land. It is
fairly well settled that a tenant may remove all improvements made
by him upon the land, unless so merged in the realty as not to be
removable without material injury to the realty, or unless an intent
that they should not be removed is shown.1 The presumption is that
they were intended to be temporary only. The old rule has also
broken down in many cases where the owner of land has himself
made the annexation, so that the ancient maxim of quicquid plantatur
solo, solo cedit can no longer be said to be a rule. This note will
be confined to the examination of the second class of cases.
At the outset it is to be noted that there is some confusion in
the definitions of the term fixtures. The difficulty is to determine
whether they shall be defined as real property, or as personal property,
or as a middle class of property, which may be realty or personalty.
A fixture has been defined by the Missouri court2 as follows: "A
fixture is something in its nature a chattel, but which has been so
planted in or attached to the soil as to be in contemplation of the
law a part of it, so that it cannot be removed without the consent
of the owner, and partakes of all legal incidents of the freehold." On
the other hand fixtures are by others defined as "personal chattels
annexed to or used in association with land and removable by the
person who so annexed or uses them." * However, it would seem
that in fact fixtures are such things as have been so fixed on land
that they may be either realty or personalty, and that they are well
defined as "things associated with, or more or less incidental to the
occupation of lands and houses or either thereof, and with regard
to which the question most frequently arising is that of their remova-
bility by the person claiming to remove them."' It is its liability
1. Tiffany, Real Property, § 240.
2. Good4n v. Edwardsvlle Hall Ass'n (1878) 5 Mo. App. 289.
3. Reeves on Real Property, § 10.
4. Brown's Law of Fixtures (4th ed.) 1 to 3.
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to raise a question between adverse claimants as to whether It is
realty or personalty that marks as a fixture an article used in con-
nection with real property.6
The tests for determining whether or not a thing used in con-
nection with land, known as a fixture, is realty or personalty have
also been differently laid down 6 A case in the United States much
cited on this subject is Teaff v. Hewitt,7 which gives three tests for
determining the removability: (1) actual annexation; (2) adaptability
to the use of the freehold; (3) the intention with which the chattel
was annexed. The court in this case came to the conclusion that
there is no one test for determining removability. The court does
not state the relative importance of these three tests, and does not
say that they must all be present in a particular case. There is,
however, a growing tendency to consider. intention as the test, and
to regard the degree of annexation and the adaptability as criteria of
intention, when intention Is not expressed. 8
The question of removability may arise between various parties
claiming an interest in fixtures as chattels on the one hand and as
realty on the other. The questions which arises as to removability
between the unpaid vendor of a chattel, who takes a mortgage back
for the purchase price or sells by conditional sale, and the mortgagee
or purchaser of the land to which the chattel has been attached,
are interesting. There are three distinct rules upon this point.
The New York rule, which is followed by a number of states, is to the
effect that in the absence of fraud the holder of the chattel mortgage
is entitled to possession as against the mortgagee or vendee of the
land, even though the chattel is apparently affixed permanently to
the land at the time of the real estate mortgage or sale.' The
Massachusetts rule, which has some following, Is to the effect that the
mortgagee or vendee of the land will always have the prior right.1"
The rule followed by the federal courts, and the rule accepted in the
majority of the United States and In England may be termed the equita-
ble rule." Under it the mortgagee or vendee of the land takes precedence
5. Reeves on Real Property, § 10.
6. 6 American Law Review 412; 7 Columbia Law Review 1.
7. (1853) 1 Ohio State 511; 3 Cent. Law Jour. 541. And see 19 Cyc.
1048, and cases cited.
8. Thomas v. Davis (1882) 76 Mo. 72; Banner Iron Works v. Aetna
Iron Works (1909) 143 Mo. App. 1, 122 S. W. 762.
9. Ford v. Cobb (1859) 20 N. Y. 344: Tifft v. Horton, 53 N. Y. 377:
Warren v. Liddell (1896) 110 Ala. 232, 20 So. 89; Eaves v. Ests (1872) 10
Kans. 314; Burrill v. Lumber Co. (1887) 65 Mich. 571, 32 N. W. 824; San
Antonio Brewing Ass'n v. Ice Co. (1891) 81 Tex. 99. 16 S. W. 797. The rule
in New York was later changed by statute. Laws of 1904, Chap. 698, amend-
ing The Lien Law (Laws of 1897, Chap. 418). §§ 112 to 118; Kirk v. Crystal(N. Y., 1907) 118 App. Dlv. 32, 34. 10.3 N. Y. Supp. 17.
10. Glary v. Owen (Mass., 1819) 15 Gray 522; Hawkins v. Hersey (1894)
86 Me. 394, 30 Ati. 14; Watertown Steam Engine Co. v. Davis (Del., 1875)
5 Houst. 192; Albert v. Uhrich (1897) 180 Pa. St. 283, 36 Atl. 745.
11. Fosdick v. Schall (1878) 99 U. S. 235, 251; Campbell v. Roddy(1888) 44 N. J. Eq. 244. 14 Atl. 279: Tibbets v. Horne (1889) 65 N. H. 242,
23 N. E. 145: Page v. Edwards (1892) 64 Vt. 124. 23 Atl. 917: Hobson v.Gorringe (1897) 1 Ch. 183.
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if he relied upon the fixture as security, the fixture having been put
on the land before the time of the real estate mortgage or sale, and
reasonably appearing to be part of the land. In such a case the
landowner and the chattel mortgagee or vendor under a conditional
sale are estopped to deny that the fixture is a part of the realty.
On the other hand, according to the equitable rule, if there is no such
estoppel the conditional vendee or mortgagee of the chattel prevails.
The rule in Missouri is not clear because the point has not been
squarely raised. In the case of Climer v. Wallace 12 two adjoining
landowners put up a partition fence. By mistake it was located
entirely upon the land of one of them. The one upon whose land
the fence was, sold the land to a third person with no notice of
the fence being a partition fence. The court in that case held that
the fence passed as a part of the realty. There was nothing to show,
however, that the fence was intended by either party to remain
personalty. In Pile v. Holloway 18 the plaintiff erected a henhouse
on his father's land with the understanding that the title should remain
in the plaintiff. The land was sold to the defendant with the under-
standing that the henhouse did not pass with it but belonged to the
son. The defendant sold the land without any reservation of the
henhouse. The plaintiff brought trover against the defendant for the
conversion of the henhouse. The court very properly held that the
henhouse had remained personalty up to the time it was sold by the
defendant, and that the selling of the land without reservation of the
henhouse amounted to a conversion. In the case of Defiance Machine
Works v. Trister " the mortgage on the land was made to include
fixtures that should be afterwards placed upon the land. The chattel
was afterwards placed upon the land under an agreement of con-
ditional sale. The mortgagee of the land had no notice that it was
so placed and claimed it as a part of his mortgage security. The
agreement of conditional sale was not recorded as required by statute.
But the court held that the vendor under the conditional sale was
entitled to the prior right. The statute 15 provided that an agreement
for a conditional sale of a chattel which was annexed to the realty
should be void as against creditors unless recorded in the proper
manner. The court held that this meant subsequent creditors and was
not intended to apply to creditors prior to the time of the condi-
tional sale. It seems plain from the reasoning of the case that if
the mortgage had been made of the land after the chattel had been
placed upon the land the mortgagee of the land would have
prevailed. The conditional sale would not by the statute have
12. (1885) 88 Mo. 556.13. (1907) 129 Mo. App. 593, 107 S. W. 1043.
14. (1886) 21 Mo. App. 69.15. Revised Statutes 1879, §J 2505 and 2507; now Revised Statutes 1909.
§ 2889.
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been effective against such mortgagee, as it would if recorded, and
the mortgagee might reasonably have relied upon the fixture as part
of his mortgage security.
In a recent case in the Kansas City Court of Appeals of American
Clay Machinery Co. v. Sedalia Brick & Tile Co.1" a machine used in
clay manufacturing was set upon a concrete foundation and attached
to the sides of the building with rods, and the removal of the machine
would have necessitated the removal of part of the wall. The machine
was sold under a conditional sale. The owner of the land subsequently
mortgaged the land and building with the machine, but specifically
stated that the machine was subject to a prior encumbrance. The
court held that the vendor under the conditional sale was entitled
to the machine. From the reasoning of the opinion, however, it is
clear that, if the mortgagee had had no notice of the prior encum-
brance, from the actual annexation and the adaptability of the machine
he would have had a right to rely upon it as a part of his mortgage
security, and that the owner of the land and the vendor under the-
conditional sale would have been estopped to deny that it was a
part of the realty. There has been no case where a subsequent
mortgagee of the land without notice has claimed the fixture, but
from the foregoing cases it follows that when the question does
arise Missouri courts will adopt the so-called equitable rule in this
class of cases. M. W.
Res Gestae.-The phrase res gestae may be found throughout
classical literature, and as used therein it indicated an event or
transaction.1 But Professor Thayer has first observed its use in a
legal meaning in 1794 in 25 Howells State Trials 440, and, while the
phrase occurred soon thereafter in several cases, Professor Thayer
points out that it was not used in a treatise until 1806.2 The phrase
was soon adopted in America,8 and has been so generally received that
scarcely a report can be opened which does not contain a case dealing
with the subject. In, accounting for the adoption of the doctrine and
phrase, Professor Thayer suggests that its use was first due to its-
"convenient obscurity," that "the lawyers and judges . .. caught at the
phrase as one that gave them relief at a pinch."' Similarly Professor
Wigmore characterizes it as "ambiguous and unmanageable in all its
various uses," as "harmful because by its ambiguity it invites con-,
fusion," and as "an empty phrase so encouraging to looseness of
thinking and uncertainty of decision."
16. (1913) 160 S. W. 903.
1. Professor James B. Thayer in 15 American Law Review 5.
2. Ibid. 7.3. Ibid. 8. See also Bartlett v. Delprat (1808) 4 Mass. 702.
4. 15 American Law Review 9 and 10.
5. Wigmort on Evidence, § 1695.
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Two different kinds of statements, which may be put in evidence,
;are often confused under the title of res gestae, though In fact the
justifications for their Introduction are quite distinct. One of these
kinds of statements is testimonial In character, and, therefore, within
the general hearsay rule, but constitutes an exception to that rule
because it is a spontaneous declaration, whose spontaneous character
makes it possible to dispense with the ordinary guarantees, such as
-oath, etc." The other of these kinds of statements is not put in
evidence for its testimonial effect, but as a "verbal act," which Is
one of the several acts making up a particular transaction in con-
troversy, and without which that transaction would be Incompletely
presented. Not being testimonial In effect it does not come within the
hearsay rule at all. 7  The statements in this class are properly res
gestae. Things which are res gestae have been variously described as
"the circumstances which are the undesigned incidents of a particular
litigated act, and which are admissible when illustrative of such act;"8
or "facts . . . which are so connected with the very transaction or
facts under investigation, as to constitute a part of it." 9 A Missouri
case " says that declarations to be admissible as part of the res gestae
must have been made contemporaneously, concerning some fact per-
tinent to the issue, and as to which the declarant could have been
examined as a witness, and must be in the nature of a verbal act
tending to uphold the nature and quality of the facts they are intended
to explain. In State v. Gabriel," a larceny case, It was said that the
res gestae are not restricted to the limited time when the fingers reach
out and grasp the articles In question; the quo animo and all actions
and words whereby that is demonstrated form part of the res gestae
.and thus become admissible in evidence to explain the nature of the
act. In State v. Davidson," a prosecution for assault and battery
.committed by an officer In unlawfully arresting the complainant, evi-
dence of what took place in the recorder's office, where the officer
took the plaintiff, was admitted as part of the res gestae. And in
State v. Crawford13 the evidence of a previous trouble provoked that
same evening in the same saloon was admitted as res gestae, though
the issue was as to the assault and battery at the hands of the officer.
In State v. Testerman 14 a prosecution for homicide, evidence that the
6. Wigmore on Evidence, § 1745.
7. Wigmore on, Evidence. § 1759. It Is often stated that the right to
put in evidence statements which are rea gestae constitutes an exception to
the hearsay rule. This results from confusing spontaneous exclamations, and
statements which are properly res gestae. McKelvey on Evidence 278; Hughes
on Evidence 56.
8. Nutting v. Page (Mass.. 1855) 4 Gray 581.
9. Hayunes v. Conmonwealth (Va., 1877) 28 Gratt. 942.
10. Corbett v. St. L., Iron Mt. S. S. R. Go. (1887) 26 Mo. App. 621.
11. (1886) 88 Mo. 631.
12. (1891) 44 Mo. App. 513.
13. (1893) 115 Mo. 620.
14. (1878) 68 Mo. 408.
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defendant had cut the decedent's brother during the fight was ad-
mitted as part of the res gestae, in a prosecution of the defendant
for killing the bar keeper. The above cases together with numberless
others '1 indicate to what extent the term has been extended. As
was well said In Jacks v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association,5 "the
modern tendency is to extend rather than narrow the rule as to
admissions of declarations as part of the res gestae."
As Professor Wigmore shows, since the declarations or verbal
acts are admitted to give legal significance to the whole, it Is logically
necessary that such verbal acts be contemperaneous with the transac-
tion In question. The strict rule was well set out in a Connecticut
case, Enos v. Tuttle, 7 where the court said, "They [the verbal acts
or declarations] must have been made at the time of the act done
which they are supposed to characterize; and have been well cal-
culated to unfold the nature and quality of the acts they were Intended
to explain, and so to harmonize with them as to constitute one
transaction." Later cases, however, have not followed the strict rule,
and absolute coincidence is not required,' 8 the evolved rule apparently
being that "declarations may be contemporaneous in the legal sense
when they precede or follow the act;" 1, that "Immediateness is tested
not by closeness of time but by causal relation." 20 In a Virginia
case, Hill v. Commonwealth,"' the court said that to make the declara-
tion part of the res gestae it is necessary that It be made recently
after receiving the injury, and before the declarant had time to make
up a story for his own advantage. The Missouri cases seem for the
most part to take the position that If there is causal relation, or if
there are connecting circumstances between the act and the declara-
tion, such declaration will be admissible as part of the res gestae.22
15. Radolph v. R. R. (1885) 18 Mo. App. 609; Northrup v. Ins. Co.(1871) 47 Mo. 435; State v. Sanders (1882) 76 Mo. 35; State v. Taylor(1893) 118 Mo. 153, 22 S. W. 806; State v. Ramsey (1884) 82 Mo. 133;
Tetherow v. R. R. (1888) 98 Mo. 74, 11 S. W. 310: State v. Fitzgerald (1895)
130 Mo. 407, 32 S. W. 1113; State v. Moore (1893) 117 Mo. 395, 22 S. W.
1086: State v. Cavin (1906) 199 Mo. 154, 97 S. W. 573; State v. Vaugh(1906) 200 Mo. 1, 98 S. W. 2: Weinstein v. Reid (1889) 25 Mo. App. 41;
Clark v. Loan Co. (1891) 46 Mo. App. 248. Only Missouri cases have been
cited. The reports of other states are as prolific of such cases as the
Missouri reports.
16. (1902) 113 Fed. 49.
17. (1820) 3 Conn. 247, 250.
18. State v. Lacey (Mont.. 1900) 61 Pac. 994: Ward v. White (1.889)
86 Va. 212, 9 S. E. 1021; Mitchem v. -State (1852) 11 Ga. 615; Hilt v. Cor.
monwealth (Va.. 1845) 2 Gratt. 605.
19. Mitchem v. State, supra.
20. Wharton's Evidence (3d ed.) § 262.
21. Hill v. Commonwealth, supra.
22. Harriman v. Stowe (1874) 57 Mo. 93; State v. Elvins (1890) 101
Mo. 243. 13 8. W. 937; State v. Kennade (1894) 121 Mo. 405. 26 S. W'. 347;
Stockman v. Terre Haute, etc., R. Go. (1884) 15 Mo. App. 503. But see
State v. Christian (1877) 66 Mo. 138 where declarations, made one-half hour
after the act, and after declarant had gone some distance, were held not
admissible as part of the res, gestae. Also State v. Rider (1888) 95 Mo. 947,
In which declarations made a few minutes after the act, the declarant having
gone 200 feet. were held not admissible as part of the res gestae.
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The recent Missouri case of State v. Rogers 23 illustrates the liberality
of the rule in Missouri. In this case the defendant became involved in
an altercation with several men and finally shot one with his revolver.
He then walked to the house of one Blankenship, 200 yards away,
put up his revolver and took down a shotgun, and on B's asking him
what he was going to do, the defendant replied, "go back and kill
every damned one of them." This declaration was admitted, over de-
fendant's objection, as part of the res gestae, the court saying that
the declaration was made "so soon after the act, and before anything
had occurred which could be reasonably calculated to interrupt or
change the condition of the defendant's mind that It was part of the res
gestae." In view of the previous discussion it would seem that this case
is perhaps justified by the present extended doctrine of res gestae, but It
must be said that from the strict, or theoretical view, the decision is not
upheld by the reasoning, and there are several Missouri cases, In point,
which are contra,21 thus showing the confusion prevalent, not only in
the decisions of the different states, but also in the decisions of the
state of Missouri. C. B. R. JR.
MISDELIVERY 1Y A COMMON CARRIER OF GooDs.-The duty of a com-
mon carrier of goods is to carry to a particular place, and that neces-
sarily implies an undertaking to deliver safely to the consignee.
The duty to deliver to the consignee is an absolute one. By the
weight of authority the carrier Is an insurer and delivery by him
is at his peril.' This liability as an insurer is a common law lia-
bility, but has a further basis in the nature of the contract of the
consignor with the carrier. The contract of the carrier is to deliver
to the particular person named as consignee. It is not unreasonable,
then, to require of the carrier a strict performance of his contract,
and at the same time this affords the owner a valuable protection
against loss of his goods.
The carrier has been repeatedly held liable in an action of
trover for conversion of goods delivered to a person other than the
consignee, even though the misdelivery was due to an innocent mis-
take, or fraud or imposition practiced upon the carrier.2 The under-
taking of the carrier is to deliver to the consignee, and when he
23. (1913) 161 S. W. 770.
24. State v. Brown (1877) 64 Mo. 567; State v. Noeninger (1891) 10S
Mo. 166; State v. Smith (1894) 125 Mo. 2.
1. Smith Express Co. v. Crook (1870) 44 Ala. 468; Claffln v. Boston C
Lowell R. Co. (Mass., 1863) 7 Allen 341; San quer v. London & S. W. Ry. Co.
(1855) 16 C. B. 163; Mobile, J. & K. C. Ry. Co. v. Bay Shore Lumber Co.
(1910) 165 Ala. 610. 51 So. 956; Hall v. Boston . Worcester R. R. Co.
(Mass.. 1867) 14 Allen 439: Adams v. Blankenstein (1852) 2 Cal. 413; Hutch-
inson on Carriers (3d ed.) Chap. 9.
2. Cavallaro v. Texas ,Ci Pacific Railwag7 Co. (1895) 110 Cal. 348, 42
Pac. 918; Viner v. The Steamship Cornpan?, (1 72) 50 N. Y. 23; Wilson Seewing
Machine Co. v. Louisville, etc. It. Co. (1879) 71 Mo. 203; Devereux v. Barclay
(1819) 2 B. & Aid. 702; Stephenson v. Hart (1828) 4 Bing. 476.
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fails to deliver to him he has failed in the performance of his under-
taking. The law has imposed on him the liability of an insurer.
No matter what care the carrier has used in trying to carry out
his undertaking, he is liable for a failure to strictly perform.
It may be, however, that delivery of goods by the carrier Is
obtained, not by fraud practiced primarily on the carrier, but on the
consignor. For Instance, suppose that A, representing himself to be
B, writes for goods to be sent to him. They are sent, addressed
to B, and delivered by the carrier to A, who Impersonates B. In a
number of jurisdictions the carrier is held liable for such delivery,
it being Insisted that the carrier, without regard to the care he used,
is not justified In delivering to anyone except to the person who the
consignor thought wrote the letter.3  The cases representing the
opposite view insist that the undertaking of the carrier is to deliver
to the consignee as directed by the consignor, and that the Intention
of the consignor is to have the goods delivered to the one who
wrote the letter.'
If this last group of cases properly interprets the consignor's
intention, then the conclusion that the carrier is not liable for
delivery to the swindler is clearly correct, for the swindler would
even have title. But if in fact the consignor's intention was to pass
title to, and to consign to the man who was impersonated, then no
title passed to the swindler, and not being the consignee, a delivery
to him by the carrier would be tortlous. The division of authority
it will be noticed is based on a difference of opinion as to what should
be considered the intention of the consignor or, in other words, a dif-
ference of opinion as to who is consignee. It Is a question upon which
the authorities are not uniform, and strong opinions can be found on
both sides.
The question of misdelivery by a common carrier was before the
St. Louis Court of Appeals in the recent case of May Department
Stores Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co.' Plaintiff shipped a box of goods
to its own store In St. Louis. The box arrived at defendant's freight
depot and a card was sent by defendant to an express company author-
ized to receive shipments for the consignee, notifying It of the arrival
of the shipment. This card was delivered by the express company
3. Pacific Express Co. v. Shearer (1896) 160 Ill. 215, 43 N. E. 816;
Winslow v. Vermont & M. I. R. Co. (1870) 42 Vt. 700: Oskamp v. Express Co.(1899) 61 Ohio St. 341, 56 N. E. 13; Louisville & N. I. R. Co. v. Fort Wayne
Electric Go. (1900) 108 Ky. 113, 55 S. W. 918: Southern Express Co. v. Van
Meter (1880) 17 Fla. 783: Equitable Powder Mfg. Co. v. St. Louis & S. F.
It. Go. (1911) 99 Ark. 497, 138 S. W. 964.
4. The Drew (1883) 15 red. 826; Wilson v. The Adams Express Co.
(1887) 27 Mo. App. 360; Pacific Express Co. v. Hertzberg (1897) 17 Tex. App.
100, 42 S. W. 795; Samuel v. Cheney (1883) 135 Mass. 278: McKean v. Me-
Ivor (1870) L. R. 6 Ex. 36. Bush v. St. 1i. K. C. & N. Ry. Co. (1876) 3
Mo. App. 62 Is valuable for discussion of cases of foreign jurisdictions, on this
-point. but In this case the carrier had become a warehouseman.
5. (1913) 160 S. W. 526.
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to one of its teamsters, who in collusion with a third person gave
the card to the latter. The third person presented the card and
received the goods. It was held that the common carrier was not
liable because the jury found he had used reasonable care in deliver-
ing the goods. The court says this Is not the case where the card
has been lost, and presented by a finder, who gets the goods. It is
hard, however, to see any real difference between the principal case
and the case supposed. The consignee had an agent with authority
to receive the goods, and a delivery to that agent would have been
a discharge of the carrier's duty. But the person who received the
goods was not the consignee's representative, nor had the consignee
done anything to estop Itself to deny that he was its representative.
It Is upon the carrier to show that the one to whom he delivered was
authorized, or that he had apparent authority to receive the
goods. There was no such proof on the part of the carrier In May
Department Store Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. The case, it seems,
is not to be decided on the basis of agency but upon the same basis
as other cases of fraud on the carrier. The carrier delivered, per-
haps, in good faith, to the third person on the strength of his pos-
session of the card notice. He is an insurer of safe carriage and
delivery to the consignee. "No circumstance of fraud, imposition or
mistake will excuse the common carrier from responsibility for de-
livery to the wrong person. The law [as we have seen] exacts of him
absolute certainty that the person to whom delivery is made is the
party rightfully entitled to the goods, and puts upon him the entire
risk of mistake In this respect, no matter from what cause occa-
sioned, however justifiable the delivery may seem to have been; or
however satisfactory the circumstances or proof of identity may have
been to his mind; and no excuse has ever been allowed for delivery
to a person for whom the goods were not intended or consigned."
The principal case is clearly a case of delivery because of imposition
upon the carrier. There was no fraud on the consignor. He sent the
goods properly consigned to the branch store. The carrier delivered
to a person other than the consignee, thinking that person was the
agent of the consignee. He delivered the goods to this person at
his peril. He should have required proof of his authority further
than mere possession of the notice. It would seem, then, that the
principal case is in conflict with the well-established rule in this
country and in England.'
W. B.
RECOVERY BETWEEN TENANTS IN COMMON FOR IMPROVEMENTS OR
REPAIRS MADE UPON THE COMMON PROPERTY.-The authorities seem to
indicate that a tenant in common cannot recover in a quasi con-
6. Hutchinson on Carriers (2d ed.) § 344.
7. Compare Sin8shcimer v. N. Y. C. d H. R. R. R. (1897) 46 N. Y. Supp.
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tractual action against his cotenants for improvements he has made
upon the common property, when made without the express or
implied authority of the cotenants. 1 Such a rule is not unreasonable-
to the tenant in common who has improved. If he thinks that
it is advantageous for him to improve the property, he may procure
partition and then do as he pleases with his share. If he does not
have the land partitioned and improves the land, he may well be
considered as having Intended to make the improvements without
compensation, or, at least, may be looked upon as a gratuitous inter-
meddler insofar as he has improved his cotenant's share.
The same reasoning may be used against recovery by one tenant.
in common for repairs upon the common property. When the prem-
ises fall into disrepair, and the cotenants will not join in repairing,
one tenant may have the property partitioned, and he may then
repair his portion as he sees fit. And yet, if one who repairs property
in which he has a common interest with others, without their consent,
is officious, his officiousness is certainly less in degree than that of
one who improves the property under like circumstances. There is a
division of authority as to recovery for repairs In an action at law.2
For improvements or repairs made under an express agreement
with the cotenant there can, of course, be a recovery on the contract.
An express contract, however, is not indispensable to a recovery.
Such circumstances may exist as will amount to an Implied authoriza-
tion to one tenant to make improvements or repairs, and require his
cotenants to share In the expense.8 The conduct of the parties, the
use made of the property, or the common purpose which all are-
striving to accomplish may go to show an understanding among
the tenants in common that all shall be liable. In order to hold
a cotenant liable at law more must be shown, however, than that
the improvements or repairs were made and he did not protest or
move to prevent their being made.'
Several states, including Missouri, have statutes which provide-
that one who bona fide puts improvements on the land of another can
recover compensation for such improvements when sued in ejectment. -
1. Coakley v. Mohar (N. Y 1885) 36 Hun 157; Spitts v. Wells (1853)
18 Mo. 469: Ballou v. Ballou (197) 94 Va. 350. 26 S. E. 840. See dicta in,
Rico Reduction Co. v. Musgrave (1890) 14 Colo. 79, 23 Pac. 458: Calvert v.
Aldrich (1868) 99 Mass. 74; Cosgriff v. Foss (1897) 152 N. Y. 104, 46 N. E.
307; Drennan v. Walker (1860) 21 Ark. 539. 557; Ward v. Ward (1895) 40
W. Va. 611, 21 S. E. 746.
2. Allowing recovery: Fowler v. Fowler (1882) 50 Conn. 256. And see-
Beaty v. Bordwhell (1879) 91 Pa. St. 438, allowing recovery where repairs were
absolutely necessary; and Cooper v. Brown (1909) 143 Iowa 482, 122 N. W. 144,
which requires a demand and refusal before allowing recovery.
Refusing recovery: Calvert v. Aldrich (1868) 99 Mass. 74. And see
Kidder v. Rixford (1844) 16 Vt. 169; Mumford v. Brown (N'. Y., 1826) 6
Cowen 475.
3. Biard v. Jackson (1881) 98 Ill. 78.
4. Crest v. Jacks (Pa.. 1834) 3 Watts 238; Cooper v. Brown. supra.
5. Arkansas Statutes 1904, § 2754; Missouri Revised Statutes 1909. 9-
2401.
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These statutes do not expressly apply to tenants In common, but
such a statute has been held to apply to such a case.' Missouri
courts have not yet passed on this question, but their general attitude
would seem to indicate that they would hold that the statute applies
to tenants in common. Macfarlane, J., has said, "While this proceed-
ing is purely statutory, the remedial portions of the statute have
ever been liberally construed in- order to an equitable and fair
adjustment of the rights of the parties.""
While, as we have seen, there can be no recovery at law for
Improvements, and the authorities are divided as to a recovery for
repairs, a tenant in common is, under certain circumstances, liable
in equity to account for rents and profits,8 and before that court
his right to compensation for Improvements and repairs is recog-
nized. In the first place, the tenant who improves, if liable for
rents and profits, Is only charged with the rental value of the
property in the condition it was in before he improved it.' Any
other rule would work an injustice to the tenant who improves the
common property. He would not only be refused compensation for
the improvements, but he would be charged rent for the use of them.
Most jurisdictions also consider improvements and repairs in reduc-
tion of the amount allowed in an accounting for rents and profits.1°
The question of compensating a tenant In common, who Improves
or repairs the common property without the consent of his cotenant,
most often arises In cases where the land is sought to be partitioned.
The court of equity tries to avoid the question of compensation by
dividing the land equally, but giving to the tenant who improved the
land that portion upon which the improvements were made. Such a
method of division, obviously, does justice to all concerned. The
method is used In all states" except Massachusetts.'2
6. Shepherd v. Jernigan (1888) 51 Ark. 275, 10 S. W. 765.
7. Co v. MeDivit (1894) 125 Mo. 358, 361, 28 S. W. 597.
8. 38 Cyc. 63.
9. Carver v. Fennfinore (1888) 116 Ind. 236, 19 N. E. 103; Hannah
v. Carver (1889) 121 Ind. 278, 23 N. E. 93; Johnson v. Pilot (1885) 24 S. C.
254; Nelson's Heirs v. Clay's Heirs (Ky., 1832) 7 J. J. Marsh. 138.
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NOTES ON RECENT MISSOURI CASES
Where a partition of the land cannot be made without injustice
to some of the cotenants, equity will have the lands sold and distribute
the proceeds. To work out justice in the distribution of the proceeds
of the sale, equity should deduct the increase in the sale price, due
to improvements and repairs, and divide the residue according to
the interests of the cotenants in the property. All that any one
tenant is entitled to is a share of the proceeds of the sale representing
his share of the land in its unimproved state, and the one who im-
proves or repairs it is entitled to the increase in the sale price due
to his labor and materials used in improving and repairing the realty.
This is the method followed in most states in cases where a sale
is found necessary.' The only objection to such a method of com-
pensating the tenant who improves the common property is that it
is difficult to find the amount to which the sale price has been in-
creased by the improvements or repairs of the tenant.
The Supreme Court of Missouri has recognized still another
method of compensating a tenant in common who improves the com-
mon property without the authority of his cotenants. In the recent
case of Armor v. Frey" the court held defendant entitled to a certain
share of the land, and that he should be compensated for improve-
ments. This compensation, it would seem, may be in the form of a
personal obligation on the part of the other cotenants, or of a lien
on the allotment to each tenant.15 This is a material extension of
the relief in equity, and it is not surprising to find several states
refusing to follow such a course,' 6 or restricting its application to
very exceptional circumstances. 17 The practice is justified by those
courts which adopt it on the ground that those who ask equity must
do equity, and that all parties in a partition suit are in the position
of claimants, but this justification is not, perhaps, entirely satisfactory.
Such practice seems to be subject to the same objections as those
raised to a quasi contractual action. The act of one cotenant in
improving is officious, and it is doubtful if a court should impose
a personal obligation on the other cotenants to make compensation.
13. Cooter v. Dearborn (1886) 115 Ill. 509, 4 N. E. 388; Sarback v.
Newell (1882) 28 Kan. 642; Clapp v. Nichols (1898) 52 N. Y. Supp. 128;
Ward v. Ward (1895) 40 W. Va. 611 21 S. E. 746; Watson v. Goss (Eng..1881) 57 L. J. . 480; Burford v. Aldrich (1901) 165 Mo. 419, 63 S. W. 109,
65 S. W. 720; Alexander v. Ellison (1880) 79 Ky. 148.
14. (1913) 253 Mo. 447, 477, 161 S. W. 829, 838. See also Armor v.
Jester (1913) 253 Mo. 480, 161 S. W. 839; Armor v. Kearney (1913) 253 Mo.
485. 161 S. W. 840; ArmOr v. Cooper (1913) 253 Mo. 483, 161 S. W. 841.
15. Atha v. ,Jewcll (1881) 33 N. J. Eq. 417; Ogle v. Adams (1877) 12W. Va. 213: Sarbach v. Newell (1883) 30 Kan. 102, 1 Pac. 30; Noble v.
Tipton (1905) 219 Ill. 182, 76 N. E. 151.
16. Jones v. Johnson (1873) 28 Ark. 211; Liscomb v. Root (Mnss., 1829)8 Pick. 376: Thorton v. York Bank (1858) 45 Me. 158; Houston v. McCluney
(1874) 8 W. Va. 135.
17. Scott v. Guernsey (1871) 48 N. Y. 106; Cosgriff v. Foss (1897) 152
N. Y. 104, 46 N. E. 307; Porter v. Osmun (1904) 135 Mich. 361. 98 N. W.
859; Gierstadengen v. Hartzell (1900) 9 N. D. 268. 83 N. W. 230; Elrad v.
Keller (1883) 89 Ind. 382.
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It is submitted that the cotenant making the Improvements should
be compensated by having the Improved portion allotted to him if
possible; or by selling the property and apportioning to him the
surplus after his cotenants have received the value of their shares
of the property before its Improvement; or even by an unequal divi-
sion of the common property, so that his cotenants would receive
shares of the improved property equal in value to their original shares
of the unimproved property, and so that the tenant making the Im-
provements should receive a share of the improved property equal
in value to his original share of the unimproved property plus the
value of the Improvements."' We have seen that where a cotenant
repairs he is felt to have a stronger case at law against his cotenants
than where he makes improvements," and similarly in a case of parti-
tion there is more reason to recognize a personal obligation on the part
of cotenants for repairs made by one of their number than for
improvements. K. B.
18. See suggestions with regard to this latter method In Sonder 8v.
Robertson (1876) 57 Ala. 465; 16 Amer. & Eng. Encyc. of Law 116; Note to
Ward v. Ward in 52 Amer. State Rep. 924, 940.
19. The second paragraph of this note.
